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Abstract
While the discipline of International Relations (IR) has a long tradition of celebrating
‘great thinkers’ and appropriating their ideas for contemporary theories, it has rarely
accounted for how these authors came to be seen as ‘great’ in the first place. This is at least
partly a corollary of the discipline’s long-standing aversion to methodological reflection in
its engagement with intellectual history, and it echoes IR’s infamous tendency to
misportray these great thinkers’ ideas more broadly. Drawing on existing attempts to
import the methodological insights of historians of political thought into IR, this article
puts forward a unified approach to the study of great thinkers in IR that combines the
tenets of so-called ‘Cambridge School’ contextualism with those of what broadly falls
under the label of reception theory. I make the case for the possibility of developing a
coherent methodology through the combination of what is often seen as separate strands
of intellectual history, and for the value of such an approach in IR. In doing so, the article
ultimately offers a more rigorous methodology for engaging with the thought of great
thinkers in IR, for analyzing the way a specific author’s ideas come to have an impact in
practice, and for assessing the extent to which these ideas are distorted in the process.
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International Relations (IR) has a long tradition of analyzing, celebrating, and
appropriating the thoughts of those it considers great thinkers. For much of the
history of the discipline, these figures have been considered sources of trans-
historical wisdom: ‘Machiavelli is a theorist of necessity and reason of state…
Hobbes is the quintessential theorist of anarchy, Grotius of international legal
order…’ while ‘Rousseau has a structural realist theory of war, Kant a progressive
theory of the democratic peace and global confederation and so on…’.1 They have
© Cambridge University Press, 2018.
1Bain and Nardin 2017. Bain and Nardin cite various classic texts that rely on great thinkers in this
particular way, including Doyle 1998; Wendt 1999; Waltz 2001; Bull 2002.
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also commonly been used as ornaments for relatively ahistorical theories, in order
to give a sense of timelessness to the theory being elaborated.2 Methodological
debates aside, great thinkers thus have been – and continue to be – an important
component of IR scholarship. Intellectual history and IR, however, have had a
rather tumultuous relationship. After a so-called ‘fifty years rift’,3 the past two
decades have witnessed a rapprochement of the two fields, which now share a
particular interest in the history of international political thought, that is, political
thought on the relations between states, empires, and other political entities,4 an
area that long remained a blind spot of the history of political thought (HPT),
which has generally focused on the state and its internal politics.
A fair part of this rapprochement stems from attempts by IR scholars to ‘take
both history and the history of political thought more seriously’,5 and to study some
of these great thinkers more rigorously. Scholars involved in IR’s ‘historiographical
turn’6 have made the value of their endeavor eminently clear, including those who
specifically study the history of political thought, as exemplified by the contributions
to a recent forum on IR and intellectual history.7 Broadly speaking, in their ability to
reveal ‘the contingency of prevailing conventions’,8 historical works in IR undermine
the pervasive tendency in the discipline to elevate ‘relatively recent structures and
orientations to the status of enduring historical essences’.9 With respect to intel-
lectual history specifically, Bain and Nardin point out that rigorous engagements
with canonical and non-canonical texts lend themselves to rethinking crucial topics
in the discipline, including ‘the primacy of the state, the emergence of the ‘states
system’, the consequences of anarchy and the principles of a just international
order’,10 to name but a few important examples. It has also been noted that intel-
lectual history provides the tools to challenge disciplinary myths by helping IR
scholars ‘understand how the IR canon was constructed and for what purposes’,11
another particularly valuable endeavor for IR scholars of a more critical bent.
With this renewed interest in intellectual history, IR scholars have moved
beyond the selective and rather tendentious misreadings of various great thinkers
by earlier IR theorists – particularly those of the English School12 – and foregone
the tradition of preemptively confining them to procrustean categories.13 At the
2For a detailed discussion of the use of great thinkers in IR, see notably Vigneswaran and Quirk 2010,
115–222.
3Armitage 2004. For a detailed analysis of the changing relationship between International Relations,
political theory, and international political theory, see Brown 2017. See also Martin’s Wight’s classic text,
Wight 1960.
4See most notably Keene 2005; Armitage 2012a.
5Bell 2001, 115.
6Bell 2001.
7See especially Bain and Nardin 2017; Brown 2017; Devetak 2017; Hall 2017.
8Vigneswaran and Quirk 2010, 109.
9Ibid., 110. The literature around the ‘myth of 1648’ is a case in point. See especially Osiander 2001;
Teschke 2003.
10Bain and Nardin 2017, 215.
11Ibid., 213.
12The criticisms of this approach are numerous and wide-ranging. As Duncan Bell puts its, ‘gross abuse
of the history of thought’ is ‘inherent in various attempts to delineate the Grotian, Machiavellian, and
Kantian traditions.’ Bell 2001, 123. More broadly, see Armitage 2012a, parts II and III.
13These include Martin Wight’s classic ‘realist,’ ‘rationalist,’ and ‘revolutionist’ categories. Wight and
Porter 1991.
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same time, IR scholars have come to reflect much more critically on the history of
the discipline, accounting for the contingent development of certain approaches
and theories and bringing to light their respective normative underpinnings.14 At
the intersection of these two developments, a few works have specifically analyzed
the reception of certain ‘great thinkers’ into IR, examining the processes through
which their ideas became considered foundational.15 This study of the reception of
texts and ideas pertaining to the international echoes a broader move within
intellectual history towards the study of the circulation, transmission, and recep-
tion of texts, thinkers, and ideas across time and space.16
These works open two notable types of paths for methodologically rethinking
the study of great thinkers in IR. The first entails elaborating a more rigorous
approach for studying these figures in their context, taking stock of the numerous
advances in the neighboring field of HPT. The second consists in developing an
explicit methodology for examining the reception of these authors’ ideas. Some
strands of IR have had a tendency to substantially overestimate the impact that
single thinkers can have on the form and conduct of IR, seamlessly associating the
thought of Grotius with the emergence of the modern states-system, to name but
one of the most famous examples. Notwithstanding the delightful anecdote about
the King of Sweden going to war with a copy of Grotius’ De iure belli ac pacis under
his saddle,17 the actual impact of the famed author’s text is often assumed away.
The emerging literature on the reception of what we now know as canonical texts
thus seems a particularly productive avenue for the discipline to turn to in order to
track the actual impact of great thinkers. This article seeks to build on these efforts
by teasing out how this might be done in a systematic manner.
Essentially, and to put it bluntly, the discipline of IR simply does not provide a
methodology for studying the reception of great thinkers. There appear to be two
main reasons behind this lacuna. First, it is partly a corollary of the discipline’s
rather infamous misportrayal of great thinkers’ ideas more broadly, and of its long-
standing aversion to methodological reflection on this front. Second, and more
importantly, it probably stems from the fact that historians of political thought in
the Anglophone academy have seldom explicitly theorized the methodologies
required to study the reception of authors.18 This is of course not to say that
historians of political thought have not studied the reception of authors in practice;
to cite but one example, in his main works, Quentin Skinner extensively studies the
reception of ancient classics such as Aristotle,19 Cicero,20 or Quintilian,21 as well as
the reception of continental rhetorical works in Britain in the early modern
period.22 The point here is that while reception theory is a well-established
14Efforts to make explicit different theories’ normative underpinnings include Reus-Smit and Snidal
2008. Critical works on the history of the discipline of International Relations include Schmidt 1998;
Guilhot 2011; Vitalis 2015.
15Keene 2002, 12–39; Keene 2006; Reid 2006; Williams 2006; Keene 2015. For a related but somewhat
different approach, see Nabulsi 1999.
16Armitage 2012a, 7. See for instance Moyn and Sartori 2013.
17Ringmar 1996, n. 174. See also Grotius 2005, 69.
18Though one notable call to address this problem is Thompson 1993.
19Notably in Skinner 1978, Vol. I.
20Ibid.
21Skinner 2002, I: 175-187; II: 264-285; III: 87–141.
22Skinner 2014b.
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sub-field in literary studies, in the not so distant field of HPT, the methodology for
studying the reception of famous texts and authors has hardly been theorized in
any explicit way, leaving little for IR scholars interested in the reception of great
thinkers to draw from. As Thompson puts it, ‘the practice of writing history and
the practice of theorizing about it remain two quite distinct activities;’23 this article
is explicitly concerned with the latter.24
The first issue has been addressed to some extent in recent years, with the dawn of
a ‘historiographical turn’ in IR. 25 Since this historiographical prise de conscience,
some attempts have been made to import the methodological insight of HPT –
particularly the contextualism of the so-called ‘Cambridge School’26 – into
the discipline,27 and this article draws explicitly on thismove. Additionally, there have
been twomain attempts to combine these contextualist insights with a concern for the
afterlife of classic works and famous concepts. The first is the call to pair Cambridge
School contextualism with the tenets of Begrifftsgeschichte.28 This approach entails
‘tracing the different meanings and usages of political concepts over time, tracing the
shifts and rupture in their employment’.29 The focus on the history of concepts is
presented as a potential remedy to the ‘temporal problem’ of the Cambridge School
approach,30 that is, the overwhelming emphasis that scholars associated with the
Cambridge School label (most notably Skinner and Pocock) are – perhaps wrongly –
considered to place on the context of writing at the cost of the context of reception.
This approach shares much with a second proposal, which is what David
Armitage has termed ‘history in ideas:’ a new history of ideas based on ‘a model of
transtemporal history, proceeding via serial contextualism to create a history in
ideas spanning centuries, even millennia’.31 Like historians working within the
tradition of Begrifftsgeschichte, Armitage puts forward a means for doing intel-
lectual history over the longue durée through the study of specific concepts over
time, such as the idea of civil war.32 While Armitage’s call for a shift towards ‘serial
contextualism’33 is a particularly interesting development for the study of
23Thompson 1993, 257.
24For a related recent attempt by IR scholars to systematize the discipline’s engagement with history, see
MacKay and LaRoche 2017.
25Bell 2001.
26The label ‘Cambridge School’ has often been criticized in light of the profound disagreements between
its main figures, most notably Skinner and Pocock. I use it here, as historians of political thought often do,
as a shorthand for a loosely coherent set of premises for how to study historical texts that does not preclude
remaining well aware of the sharp differences between the scholars associated with this approach.
27See especially Bell 2002; Bell 2003.
28Bell 2002, 334. For a similar call in HPT, see especially Richter 1995; Palonen 2014. See also Lehmann
and Richter 1996; Palonen 1999. For a critique, see Bevir 2011, 20.
29Bell 2002, 333.
30Ibid.
31Armitage 2012b, 494. There has been an explosion of works in longue durée intellectual history over
the past decade. Other examples of studies of conceptual transformation (works sometimes called ‘neo-
Lovejoyian,’ despite the significant differences) include Jerrold Seigel on the idea of the self (2005), Darrin
McMahon on the ideas of happiness (2005) and genius (2013), Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison on
objectivity (2007), Peter Garnsey on property (2007), Sophia Rosenfeld on common sense (2011), Rainer
Forst on toleration in conflict (2013), and James Kloppenberg on democracy (2016).
32Armitage 2012b; Armitage 2017. Another example would be the concept of ‘empire,’ as analyzed in
Muldoon 1999. A particularly interesting corollary to this new approach to the diachronic history of
concepts is the recent turn towards the role of translation in the diffusion of concepts. See notably the
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international political thought – to which I will return – both of these proposed
approaches are geared towards the study of the reception of specific concepts
rather than of specific authors. Conversely, while there is indeed a handful of
studies that do examine the reception of great thinkers in IR34 they do not theorize
their methodological approach explicitly.
Therefore, what I put forward in this article is an alternative form of ‘serial
contextualism’, focused on the reception of an author rather than of a concept, and
anchored in that author’s original context of writing. The approach is based on a
two-part method. The first part entails what may be termed a conventional con-
textualist analysis, based on a synchronic understanding of context. It is geared first
and foremost towards attempting to recover the original intention that the author
had in writing the relevant text, and particularly her intention in making one or
more conceptual moves within that text. The second part takes stock of the recent
shift in intellectual history towards a diachronic understanding of context and
seeks to understand the impact of that author’s move by tracing the reception of
her text over time. In doing so, it parts with concept-based methods that stem from
the history of ideas and draws on the precepts of what is broadly known as
‘reception theory’, focused on analyzing the reception of a specific author. The
serial contexts that are examined are therefore not those in which a concept
appears, but those in which the author – or one of the author’s most famous texts –
is explicitly drawn on, reinterpreted, and re-used.
In developing this approach, I will make the case that rather than constitute two
separate and potentially irreconcilable forms of methods, that is, a classic con-
textualist analysis of an author’s idea versus a diachronic study of the reception of
the said author, these two paths can actually be combined in highly productive
ways. There is nothing in the contextualism associated predominantly with
Quentin Skinner that precludes the study of reception; on the contrary, con-
textualism does in fact provide some theoretical and conceptual resources for
addressing the issue of reception; the main issue is that its adherents – whether in
HPT or in IR – have failed to discuss them adequately and to utilize them explicitly
in their work. In this article, I therefore bring together some of the methodological
insights of Skinnerian contextualism and of reception theory, developing an
explicit methodology for the study of great thinkers in IR and beyond that aims to
be eclectic while avoiding the pitfalls of indiscriminate association.
In the first part of the article, I begin by outlining the core insights of a con-
ventionally contextualist approach, before highlighting both the possibility and the
current limitations of contextualism when it comes to understanding the reception
of a particular thinker’s ideas. In the second part, I turn to reception theory and
I argue that the latter can be effectively paired with a more conventional con-
textualist methodology in order to better evaluate the journey of an author’s ideas
over time. I ultimately put forward an approach for the study of great thinkers in
IR that is both synchronic and diachronic, but that, unlike recent attempts to
reinvent the history of ideas based on the return of the longue durée, is focused not
on the reception of a particular concept but on that of a particular author. While
introduction to Burke and Richter 2012. In IR, see Wigen 2015. More broadly, on global intellectual history
and analyzing the way concepts travel, see the introduction of Moyn and Sartori 2013.
33Armitage 2012b, 494.
34See supra note 15.
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this approach is relevant to the study of political thought in general, it is parti-
cularly potent within IR, where the tendency has been to think about great thinkers
diachronically, if without articulating a specific methodology for doing so and
resultantly committing a number of considerable blunders. Using IR’s reliance on
Kant and Thucydides as brief examples to illustrate my claim, I show the extent to
which a more systematic use of this approach would benefit the discipline’s
engagement with historical works. Importantly, this article does not take a stance
on the question of whether or not IR scholars ought to draw any philosophical
insights from classical texts without extensive concerns for historicity. The aim
here is merely to take into account the very concrete consequences of the frequent
anachronistic readings of texts, and to consider these moments of rediscovery and
reinterpretation in their own historical right, teasing out the stories they tell us
about our constructions of the past.
Taking context seriously: Tracking the aims of innovating ideologists
In light of the numerous critiques of IR’s abuse of the history of political thought in
the construction of its canon and its traditions,35 the value of contextualist
methodologies seems fairly self-explanatory. This avenue is particularly promising
in light of the recent surge of interest in international political thought, both from
IR scholars and from historians.36 In its broad commitment to historicism, con-
textualism urges scholars not to consider great thinkers as taking part in perennial
debates across time and space, nor as speaking a common language and providing
insights into solving timeless problems, including those of our own period.37 More
specifically, contextualism emphasizes that texts must be ‘regarded as extremely
complex historical objects, which were written with a purpose in mind’ and thus as
‘a form of action’.38
What exactly this entails in terms of conducting research has been the subject of
fierce methodological battles. Skinner is of course the most famous of the ‘Cam-
bridge School’ contextualists, and his brand of contextualism, sometimes called
‘Skinnerian contextualism’ or ‘Skinnerian linguistic contextualism’39 is often
associated with the broader label. However, as Bell notes, ‘not all contextualists are
Skinnerian’.40 In fact, Skinner himself seems to have evolved quite significantly
over the course of his career, and is now rather difficult to place in terms of his own
commitment to his initial methodological claims as well as his evaluation of more
recent alternatives, most notably post-analytical historicism.41 Much of the pro-
blem here stems from the incredibly demanding character of Skinner’s original
methodological recommendations, which resulted from his stark philosophical
35Bell 2002. More broadly, see Jahn 2006.
36This body of works is to be distinguished from the ‘problem-solving’ approach to IPT discussed (and
criticized) by Beate Jahn, in Jahn 2006. In IR, see especially Keene 2005. In history, see for instance Tuck
2001; Armitage 2000.
37For the seminal critique of such approaches (most notably that of Leo Strauss), see Skinner 1969.
38Bell 2002, 116.
39Sometimes also called ‘conventionalism’, particularly by Mark Bevir. Bevir 2011.
40Bell 2003, 153. Bell is thinking here of the other Cambridge School historians, particularly Pocock and
Dunn. See his note 11.
41Bevir 2009. See also, for instance, Skodo 2009. On Skinner’s “genealogical turn” and its methodological
implications, see Lane 2012.
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stance and which even he struggled to accommodate in his own historical
research.42 Despite these unresolved tensions and debates, some broad principles
for investigation can be drawn out. Indeed, these issues around Skinner’s original
philosophical position notwithstanding, contextualists virtually all agree with the
general aim of Skinner’s project, that is ‘the historicization of political thought and
the attempt to locate texts within their original terms of reference’.43 Studying texts
with no regard for the context in which they were written, they argue, is bound to
lead to gross errors of interpretation.44
Outlining all the theoretical underpinnings of this broad contextualist project is
beyond the scope of this article,45 but it is important here to note a few essential
aspects of a contextualist approach. While Skinner’s early methodological writings
were part of a general intellectual wave now known as ‘interpretivism’ (written in
dialogue with scholars such as Alasdair MacIntyre and Clifford Geertz) that made
claims about society as a whole, and while Skinner would hardly have considered
his early methodological writings to be solely aimed at instructing readers about
how best to read old texts, Skinnerian contextualism is now associated first and
foremost with the objective of recovering the intention of the author, and with the
idea that the author’s intention is necessarily suited to achieving a particular
objective in a particular context. This entails acquiring a deep understanding of the
socio-political context as well as – very importantly – the linguistic context of the
author. There are some broad guidelines for achieving this understanding, mainly
the study of ‘both minor and major texts that existed at the time of writing of the
particular text under examination, in order to gain an understanding of the various
political languages employed, and the links between them’, and the attempt to
relate them to ‘the general historical environment’.46 Furthermore, in reading the
text of interest, it is essential to grasp both its locutionary and its illocutionary
force. This distinction, drawn by Skinner, separates the mere lexical meaning of
words (locutionary force), from what the author was actually doing in using them
(illocutionary force). The two are deeply intertwined, and capturing the intention
of the author ultimately depends on being able to distinguish them and truly grasp
the illocutionary force of the text. In order to achieve this aim, Bell suggests that it
is ‘highly advisable’ to use ‘a dose of methodological pluralism’47 rather than
strictly follow Skinner’s original methodological precepts, as suggested by Skinner’s
own practice in Liberty before Liberalism and even more strikingly in his Genealogy
of the Modern State.48
Before delving deeper into the specifics of this form of contextualism, I would
like to pause here for a moment to reflect on what is essentially a certain parti pris
in this article. There is, of course, a broader debate within hermeneutics about
whether it is at all possible, or even desirable, to recover authorial intention in the
42On the tension between Skinner’s metatheoretical projects and his actual historical research, see
Richter 1995, 135–6.
43Bell 2003, 153.
44Skinner’s seminal critique provides numerous examples of these errors. See Skinner 1969.
45For comprehensive theoretical accounts of contextualist methods in intellectual history, see Hunter
2006; Hunter 2007; Skinner 2002; Pocock 2009, Vol. I.
46Bell 2002, 332.
47Ibid. More broadly, see Dunn 1996.
48Skinner 1998; Skinner 2008.
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first place. For one, there is much to be said about Hans-Georg Gadamer’s claim
that we are bound to read historical texts through our own historically determined
situatedness, that is, through our often unconscious interests, prejudices, and
broader imaginaries. In Gadamer’s own words, the ‘tyranny of hidden prejudices…
makes us deaf to what speaks to us in tradition’.49 Yet, I agree with Skinner that
‘instead of bowing to this limitation and erecting it into a principle, we should fight
against it with all the weapons that historians have already fashioned in their efforts
to reconstruct without anachronism the alien mentalités of earlier periods’.50 In
other words, while it may be impossible to entirely free ourselves of unconscious
prejudices in our attempts to reconstruct the past and specifically the authorial
intentions of long-dead writers, we can at least try to avoid them as much as
we can.
A related but deeper critique suggests that we should problematize the concept
of the author itself. The most radical version of this critique is arguably Roland
Barthes’ idea of the ‘death of the author’,51 according to which the meaning of a
written text and the creator of that text are only tangentially related. For him, the
idea of the all-important author is a product of modernity, an illusion from which
we must distance ourselves in establishing the meaning of texts. Barthes argues that
the meaning of a text depends not on the text’s author but on its readers, creating
an almost endless array of interpretive possibilities. This presumably goes directly
against the idea that we can – or even should – recover authorial intention, as well
as, more broadly, some kind of ‘truth’ about the settled meaning of a text within a
context, and it opens the door to a much more relativist approach to the study of
historical texts. Again, this form of postmodernist critique is something Skinner
has explicitly addressed,52 and I side with his view of what contextualist intellectual
historians are trying to achieve. The problem, he tells us, stems from a confusion
about the term ‘meaning’. What contextualists like him seek to recover is not the
meaning of a text as in the French signification, but its meaning as in the French
vouloir dire, as a linguistic act of a public or social character. In other words, there
is a clear distinction between the linguistic meaning of a text (which arguably
cannot be recovered or even settled) and what an author meant by what he or she
wrote.53 It is exclusively with respect to the latter that authorial intention is crucial,
and it ultimately decenters authorship without entirely abolishing it.54
Beyond these debates between historians, philosophers, and literary theorists, it
is highly significant for the purposes of this article that within IR, one would be
49Gadamer 2004, 282.
50Skinner 2002, II: 195.
51Barthes 1984, 61–67.
52Skinner 2014a.
53On the importance of distinguishing between the “meaning” of a text as determined by authorial
intention, and the “significance” of a text as determined by readers’ response, see also Hirsch 1967; Hirsch
1976.
54While, of course, this does not entirely settle these profound disagreements, the fact is that after
decades of debate on hermeneutics and methodology, Skinnerian contextualism has essentially won its
battles within political philosophy, to the extent that historical studies of political theory are flourishing
and gradually squeezing out the alternatives (see Bevir 2011, 19). This does not necessarily undermine the
validity of competing methodologies, particularly as Skinner’s approach continues to be criticized (for a
broad overview, see Ibid., 19–22), but it should make the further and more systematic use of Skinnerian
contextualism in IR, as suggested in the present article, relatively uncontroversial.
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hard pressed to find a scholar who does not present her interpretation of a great
thinker’s text as a historically accurate rendition of that thinker’s thought. While
some may argue that the references to the works of great thinkers are often meant
as interventions in the present rather than truly historical forays, virtually no IR
scholar has claimed to be using the likes of Grotius and Kant on purely analytical
or instrumental grounds. On the contrary, they present their understanding of
these thinkers’ works as historically informed, as what these thinkers ‘really
thought’.55 Great thinkers are almost invariably used as more or less opportunistic
appeals to authority specifically because they confer a sense of historical pedigree
and continuity to the argument at hand. Using great thinkers solely and explicitly
as heuristic devices, with a stated lack of concern for what these thinkers actually
meant in their text, would in many ways defeat the purpose of using them in the
first place. As such, it is precisely because of IR scholars’ broad claims to historical
accuracy that it is warranted to take them to task on the question of authorial
intention, as this article ultimately seeks to do.
With this in mind, let me now return to the basic tenets of Skinnerian con-
textualism. Crucially, to the extent that one can recover authorial intention through
a contextualist methodology, the purpose of doing so is not mere antiquarianism.
In Skinner’s words, it enables one to speak to contemporary concerns by showing
‘how the concepts we still invoke were initially defined, what purposes they were
intended to serve, what view of public power they were used to underpin’.56 Here,
it is important to note that if Skinner has expressed a certain skepticism towards
the history of concepts, and particularly the study of unit-ideas as advocated by
Lovejoy, he does not reject the study of concepts altogether. In his own words, the
argument is simply that ‘there can be no histories of concepts; there can only be
histories of their uses in argument’.57 This caveat does not mean that it is
impossible to write about concepts altogether; ultimately, Skinner himself finds it
sufficiently manageable to still write on concepts such as liberty or the state.
Simply, Skinner reminds us that ‘concepts must not be viewed simply as propo-
sitions with meanings attached to them; they must also be thought of as weapons
(Heidegger’s suggestion) or as tools (Wittgenstein’s term)’.58 As a result, one can
only understand a particular concept and the text in which the concept occurs if
55A relevant example is Graham Allison’s enormously influential Destined for War: Can the US and
China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? Allison clearly believes his reading of Thucydides is an accurate reflection
of what the Athenian historian actually meant in his History of the Peloponnesian War, see Allison 2017,
xiv–xvi.
56Skinner 1998, 110.
57Restated by Skinner in 1988, in Skinner 1988a. It is worth noting that Michael Freeden has criticized
Skinner’s ‘hostility to the study of “the ‘idea’ itself as a ‘unit”’,’ arguing that his hostility is too dependent on
a critique of Lovejoy’s concept of the idea-unit, and ‘does not do justice to the different ways in which an
idea unit may be handled.’ To discuss ideas, Freeden argues, is ‘not tantamount to insisting that they have a
life of their own, and it is not therefore necessary to adopt some of the excesses of Idealism or to offend
against historical canons. For when those ideas are located within ideologies and their existence is
empirically ascertained to relate to concrete groups in specific historical situations, much of the force of the
old criticisms of the history of ideas as a discipline is dissipated.’ Through this claim, Freeden argues for the
political concept to remain the central unit of analysis of the history of ideas, for ‘[a]fter all, one cannot just
disregard the plausible contention that the history of (political) ideas should be about ideas.’ Freeden 2008,
110–111.
58See Quentin Skinner’s contribution in Collini 1985.
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one knows ‘who is wielding the concept in question, and with what argumentative
purposes in mind’.59
Skinner provides some specific tools for analyzing the use of concepts under this
specific angle, two of which are of particular importance for our purposes: the idea
of an ‘innovating ideologist’ and the related notion of what Skinner calls ‘evalua-
tive-descriptive terms’. The innovating ideologist seeks ‘to legitimate a new range
of social actions which, in terms of the existing ways of applying the moral
vocabulary prevailing in his society, are currently regarded as in some way unto-
ward or illegitimate’.60 The innovating ideologist does so through speech acts
centered on ‘evaluative-descriptive terms’, that is, words that are used both to
describe, and to either commend or condemn certain actions. These terms are of
particular importance, because as Skinner puts it, ‘it is essentially by manipulating
this set of terms that any society succeeds in establishing and altering its moral
identity’.61 The innovating ideologist thus seeks to manipulate the meaning of
concepts (and/or their application) with the aim of modifying political behavior.
The insights provided by a close analysis of innovating ideologists and of their
use of evaluative–descriptive terms, and by a contextualist approach more broadly,
present a real potential for critique in IR. This potential has been laid out in some
detail by scholars such as Duncan Bell,62 Beate Jahn,63 Gerard Holden,64 as well as
Darshan Vigneswaran and Joel Quirk65 and to some extent Richard Devetak,66 and
I will not restate their arguments here. Suffice it to say that this approach can shed
significant light on the role of language in the constitution of political and social
life, particularly in terms of how the vocabularies of a given time can both enhance
and constrain political legitimacy, and how they can be consciously manipulated in
attempts to impact political behavior. As Alasdair MacIntyre puts it, ‘since to
possess a concept involves behaving or being able to behave in certain ways in
certain circumstances, to alter concepts, whether by modifying existing concepts or
by making new concepts available or by destroying old ones, is to alter behavior’.67
There are, however, two broad types of limitations to this contextualist
approach. First, as mentioned earlier, Skinner has not always been consistent in
applying his own methodological precepts, and various critiques have been made of
Skinner’s original philosophical stance, most notably by Mark Bevir.68 These are
part of an ongoing debate on the modalities of textual interpretation, the details of
which stem from disagreements about the philosophy of history that is beyond the
scope of the present article. Second, and more urgently for our purposes, Skin-
nerian contextualism currently presents some limitations when it comes to ana-
lyzing the reception of texts. Once they have been published, texts take on a life of
their own – sometimes for centuries – which often leads them to be understood in




62Especially in Bell 2002; Bell 2003.
63Especially in Jahn 2006.
64Holden 2002.
65Vigneswaran and Quirk 2010.
66Devetak 2014a. For a more skeptical view emphasizing the limits of contextualism in IR, see Hall 2017.
67MacIntyre 1966, 2–3.
68For an introductory discussion, see Bevir 2011.
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original intention so carefully unearthed by a Skinnerian approach. In other words,
there is often an important divide between the context of writing and the context of
reception.
Skinner has repeatedly come under fire for what is perceived as his overly
restrictive understanding of context, focused almost exclusively on the immediate
context of the author at hand, and for his resulting failure to address the reception,
transmission, and translation of texts.69 This is not so much inherent to Skinner’s
methodological approach, as merely the result of his deliberate prioritization of the
recovery of authorial intention over other pursuits, a point which Skinner has
made explicitly.70 Though his methodological writings have focused predominantly
on the question of how best to recover authorial intention, in his substantive works
Skinner has in fact analyzed processes of reception and the multiplicity of contexts
they call upon. In examining, for instance, the revival of Aristotle’s Politics in the
second half of the thirteenth century or in qualifying its impact through an
emphasis on the weight of Roman moralists and historians (especially Cicero and
Sallust) decades earlier,71 Skinner makes it very clear that classical texts were
participants in a range of different debates across time and space.
If anything, questions of reception and transtemporal transmission have long
been staples of ‘Cambridge School’ contextualism, both in Skinner’s famous
Foundations of Modern Political Thought and, even more conspicuously, in the
works of another Cambridge historian, John Pocock, who gradually came to place
‘much more emphasis upon the historical significance of reception, reading, and
the modes of interaction among author, text, and reader’,72 and whose concerns for
Kuhnian ‘paradigms’ and competing ‘languages’ speak directly to these issues.73 As
such, the claim here is not so much that the study of the reception of texts
constitutes an addition to ‘Cambridge School’ contextualism, but rather than it is
an immanent possibility within this form of contextualism that has not been
sufficiently theorized as a methodological approach for studying great thinkers in
IR and beyond.74 In order to further develop and systematize this approach,
I therefore turn to the tenets of what broadly falls under the label of ‘reception
theory’.75
From context to contexts: the diachronic lives of great thinkers
First, it is worth noting that, within the study of international political thought, an
important attempt has already been made to address the perceived shortcomings of
69For various critiques of Skinner’s strict understanding of and emphasis on context, see notably
McMahon and Moyn 2014, particularly the essays by McMahon, Gordon, Müller, and Moyn.
70Skinner 1988a, 271–273.
71See notably Skinner 2002, II: 10-38.
72Thompson 1993, 271.
73See notably Pocock 1972.
74The fact that, in a certain sense (and depending on how one defines a “text”), historians who focus on
authorial intent (“intentionalists” such as Skinner) and historians inspired by reception theory undertake
compatible tasks that simply seek to unpack different aspects of given texts is briefly discussed by Bevir, see
Bevir 1999, 58.
75Importantly, reception theory is in fact a broad form of ‘contextualism’ as well. The so called
‘Cambridge School’ contextualism is merely the dominant strand of contextualism amongst historians of
political philosophy, see Bevir 2011, 11.
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Skinner’s brand of contextualism: David Armitage’s notion of a history in ideas,
based on the notion of ‘serial contextualism’. Echoing the usual line of critique,
Armitage argues that since Skinner’s famous 1969 piece,76 intellectual historians
who identify as contextualists have ‘construed context synchronically and punc-
tually: that is, defined with a narrow chronology and implicitly discontinuous with
other contexts’.77 By contrast with this approach, Armitage suggests ‘deploying the
distinctive procedures of Anglo-American intellectual history, but by doing so
diachronically as well as synchronically’.78 His method entails ‘the reconstruction
of a sequence of distinct contexts in which identifiable agents strategically deployed
existing languages to effect definable goals such as legitimation and delegitimation,
persuasion and dissuasion, consensus-building and radical innovation’.79 As I have
noted, in practice, this approach is actually hardly different from what historians
associated with the Cambridge School label – including Skinner – have done in
their own work. And indeed, Armitage concedes that Cambridge historians have
pursued this approach to a certain extent, pointing to Pocock’s Machiavellian
Moment,80 Tuck’s Rights of War and Peace,81 and Skinner’s Genealogy of the
Modern State.82 Ultimately, he seems to suggest that what is revolutionary in his
approach is not the practice of studying series of contexts, but the fact of explicitly
theorizing context in diachronic terms.83
Generally speaking, the renewed focus on longue durée intellectual history is a
promising move for IR scholars who share with intellectual historians an interest in
international political thought. Constructing diachronic histories of ‘big ideas’, that
is ‘central concepts in our political, ethical and scientific vocabularies’,84 based on
serial contextualism is certainly a fruitful enterprise, if also a tremendously chal-
lenging one in light of the knowledge of each context required for a rigorous
application of this method. The present article, however, is concerned with the
impact which specific authors have as such, in light of the reception of their texts,
rather than with the broader impact they may have once a concept they have
contributed to shaping travels and is applied by others, with the author’s name
receding into the background. As such, the article also takes stock of the potential
of diachronic histories, but it does so from an altogether different angle. Concept-
based diachronic approaches, whether those like Melvin Richter’s stemming
explicitly from Begrifftsgeschichte or those like Armitage’s that seek the ‘reinven-
tion’ of the history of ideas altogether (hence the ‘history in ideas’), do not provide
an explicit methodology for the study of how a specific author – rather than a
specific idea – travels. In order to outline such an approach, it is necessary to turn
to reception theory and examine the value of combining its insights with those of
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Though it initially struggled to travel from its German bases to the Anglophone
academy,85 reception theory has now been used extensively across numerous
fields,86 but it has not had much success in IR despite the existence of a handful of
works that directly examine the reception of certain great thinkers.87 These few
forays have emerged in the context of the aforementioned turn towards the study
of international political thought, but they very much remain the exception in a
field that continues to acclaim and appropriate original texts without examining
how these texts came to form part of the disciplinary canon in the first place. The
neighboring field of HPT has a longer and more sustained tradition of engaging
with these questions in practice, but as Armitage argues, it has not explicitly
theorized how to study context in diachronic terms either. The extensive literature
on the reception of classical thinkers in the medieval and the early modern period88
– with Aristotle and Tacitus being two of the most famous cases – is an obvious
testament to this substantive engagement, while the literature on the reception of
late medieval and early modern thinkers in the nineteenth and twentieth century,
though noticeably slimmer, is another promising avenue of research in the dis-
cipline. In another closely related though much younger field – the history of
international law – some work has notably emerged on the revival of Vitoria by
James Brown Scott in the late nineteenth century,89 with Anne Orford making an
explicit call for the wider study of the anachronistic revival of great thinkers in
international law, a call that is now beginning to be applied in practice.90
Examining the reception of great thinkers is an obvious – if, in IR, insufficiently
exploited – means of assessing the actual impact of their ideas by evaluating the
way their concepts were used, re-used, and misused in their intellectual afterlife.
While IR scholars can draw some insights from the way the reception of various
authors has been analyzed in HPT, it is essential to develop a clearer, explicit
methodology for doing so systematically. In what follows, I thus draw two core
insights from reception theory that allows for a more rigorous study of the
reception of particular authors, and then highlight two crucial payoffs of applying
these methodological precepts.
85For the original texts, see mainly Jauss 1970; Grimm 1977; Iser 1984. For a discussion of the lukewarm
reaction to reception theory in the United States, see Holub 1982.
86For a brief survey of the history of reception theory, see Burke 2013. For a general introduction to
reception theory see Holub 1984.
87See supra note 15.
88Ancient historians and classicists who focus on the legacy of classical antiquity in the later history of
political thought include Peter Garnsey, Fergus Millar, Wilfried Nippel, Paul Rahe, Elizabeth Rawson, and
Jennifer Tolbert Roberts. Cited in Straumann 2016, 13.
89Orford 2013. See also Paolo Amorosa’s doctoral work, Amorosa 2018.
90One example – although it is not quite what Orford is referring to in her call to study the revival of
famous jurists and the anachronistic use of their work for new purposes – is the work of Elisabetta Fiocchi
Malaspina on the reception of Vattel’s Le Droit des Gens in the nineteenth century. Fiocchi Malaspina
2013; Fiocchi Malaspina 2014. Fiocchi also provides some broader, fascinating insights into processes of
appropriation and reproduction of the doctrines of international law during the 19th century. Fiocchi
Malaspina and Keller-Kemmerer 2014. Another piece that discusses anachronisms and the history of
international law – though from a different angle – is Warren 2017. For a broader analysis of the insights
International Relations can gain from a more sustained engagement with the critical history of interna-
tional law, see Pitts 2017.
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First, recipients are not passive followers, and what is received or inherited is not
necessarily what was given or handed over.91 In other words, those who ‘receive’
the texts of great thinkers have a considerable amount of agency, and they may
alter the text in significant ways, whether they directly add elements to it or simply
reinterpret it for their own purposes.92 Aquinas’ famous formulation is often cited
on this point: Quidquid recipitur, ad modum recipientis recipitur: whatever is
received is received according to the manner of the receiver.93 It is thus much more
useful to think of the process of reception as one of translation rather than
transmission. This is a crucial point in thinking about the impact of a specific
author’s ideas, but as Peter Burke remarks, ‘[a]lthough the famous epigram
attributed to Karl Marx, “I am not a Marxist,” has been circulating for a long time,
the implications for intellectual history of the distance between founders and
followers have rarely been made explicit’.94 A particularly useful tool for further
conceptualizing these differences is the concern with the ‘horizon of expectations’
(Erwartungshorizont), found notably in the works of the aforementioned Hans-
Georg Gadamer and his student Wolfgang Iser. The underlying idea here is that
different readers will approach a specific text with different expectations –
including different questions and concerns associated with their own environment
– and that this will shape the way they understand the text in various respects. The
results can be conceptualized through terms such as ‘appropriation’ (Ricoeur) or
‘re-employment’ (de Certeau), or as a form of intellectual ‘bricolage’ (Lévi-Strauss)
that turns consumption into a form of production in itself.95
Second, and relatedly, this emphasis on active/creative rather than passive/
faithful reception suggests that in order to understand the importance of an
author’s text, we must examine it not just in its original context but in the various
contexts in which it came to play an important role. In other words, it is crucial not
just to examine the ‘reception’ of a text, but its multiple receptions, across different
groups, countries, and epochs. Through this process, one may conceptualize the
multiple embodiments of the same author, used for different purposes under
different circumstances – or, for example, under the same circumstances but for
different political purposes. For instance, Kinch Hoekstra speaks of ‘multiple
Thucydides’ in the early modern period, notably highlighting the gap between
Alberico Gentili’s Thucydides and Thomas Hobbes’ Thucydides. 96 The impact of a
particular text can thus become kaleidoscopic, refracted through the many contexts
in which it is creatively put to use. In analyzing this process, two related avenues of
investigation seem particularly fruitful. On the one hand, one should compare the
original reception of the text, the impact the author had in her original context,
with later receptions, that may have altered the author’s reputation quite drasti-
cally.97 On the other hand, one should pay particular attention to the impact the
91Burke 2013, 22.
92On this phenomenon in the context of international law, see notably Wallenius 2017.
93Aquinas 2015, 1a, q. 75, a. 5; 3a, q.5, cited in Burke 2013, 29.
94Burke 2013, 23. Burke points to Benjamin Schwartz on Confucian Thought as an important exception.
Schwartz 1959.
95Ricœur 1981; Certeau 1980, cited in Burke 2013, 25.
96Hoekstra 2008; Hoekstra 2016.
97This is the approach taken in A Handbook of the Reception of Thucydides, for instance. The
Handbook juxtaposes a chapter on Thucydides’ ancient reputation with one his reception in the
Renaissance. Lee and Morley 2014.
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text will have when it is seized on by influential individuals who actually have the
means of giving the text a renewed importance and of redefining what is in fact
important about it.
Applying these two methodological tenets opens the way for a number of
productive intellectual moves, two of which stand out as especially fruitful payoffs.
First, studying an author not just in her original context but through her different
receptions over time is a methodological approach that answers David Armitage’s
call for a return to longue durée intellectual history, though in a different way from
his own application of it.98 It is an approach that is deeply committed to examining
the author and her work diachronically, sacrificing some of the depth of traditional
contextualist investigations for the breadth of trans-epochal comparisons. This
seems a particularly useful approach within IR, a discipline in which scholars
almost invariably analyze great thinkers diachronically despite lacking an explicit
methodology for how to do so adequately. Of course, the point of a diachronic
approach based on reception theory is not to study authors in a decontextualized
manner, applying their categories and concepts indiscriminately across time and
space, but rather to pay close attention to the various contexts in which they were
explicitly received, potentially stretching the story of their impact over continents
and centuries. As such, it distances itself from the English School’s concept of
traditions99 as well as from the broader practice of diachronically examining the
history of a concept through a long collection of great thinkers.100
Second, reception theory provides a particularly useful set of tools for analyzing
the construction of intellectual canons.101 The importance of ‘canons’ and ‘tradi-
tions’ has not escaped IR scholars,102 and indeed, Bell points out that while Skinner
is right to be suspicious of ‘claims about easily delineated transhistorical ideational
bodies’, we must also ‘recognize the vital role of perceived traditions’, that is ‘the
relationship theorists sustain with those they consider to be their intellectual
progenitors’.103 As Freeden explains, ‘[i]nasmuch as people come to attach
importance to reified traditions, however erroneously conceived the latter are, they
become factors in the formation of human thought and in the explanation of
human behavior’.104 Perceived traditions can of course be based on various
98Armitage and Guldi 2014; Guldi and Armitage 2014. For a brief discussion of the study of receptions
as an example of longue durée intellectual history, see Straumann 2016, 20.
99For an early discussion of these features, see Dunne 1993. For a more recent analysis, see Keene 2013.
100For instance, this is a particularly popular approach in the field of just war theory with regards to the
study of the ‘just war tradition,’ see notably O’Driscoll and Brunstetter 2017.
101Thompson 1993, 249.
102Though some have been explicitly critical of any attempt to construct them, such as Brian Schmidt,
who sees these traditions as developed either for polemical purposes or as a way to legitimize contemporary
ideas. Schmidt 1998, 24. For a more sympathetic approach, see Nabulsi 1999, 66–79; Nabulsi and
Hazareesingh 2008.
103Bell 2002, 333. For a similar emphasis on the importance of ‘invented traditions’ in IR, see also Jeffery
2005.
104Freeden 2008, 110. This echoes Hobsbawm’s concern with ‘invented traditions,’ the study of which
‘throws a considerable light on the human relation to the past… For all invented traditions, so far as
possible, use history as a legitimator of action and cement of group cohesion.’ Hobsbawm and Ranger
1992, 12. Importantly, these approaches differ from Mark Bevir’s own concept of tradition as explained in
Bevir 2000. Bevir is also concerned with traditions and their legitimating power, but he has a much more
specific understanding of what a tradition consists of. For him ‘[a]n account of a tradition must identify a
set of connected beliefs and habits that intentionally or unintentionally passed from generation to
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elements, including concepts, as in the case of liberalism,105 or authors, as in the
case of a ‘Grotian tradition’ of international law and political thought.106 With
respect to the latter, an approach that focuses first and foremost on the reception of
the author’s text(s) appears essential, and fulfills a distinct purpose from one
focused on the transformation of concepts. As such, for author-based traditions, it
becomes essential to track the complex story of the reception of the author, par-
ticularly as in the case of a discipline such as IR, the interpretation of an author will
have been shaped and re-shaped many times before entering the field. Ultimately,
the novel interpretation put forward by the receivers ‘may have shaped core
concepts in the discipline’, in which case ‘a historical recovery of their roots is one
way of opening up these concepts for critical reflection’.107
If one wishes to understand the emergence, evolution, modification, and
reproduction of a canon,108 and ultimately the development of perceived traditions
or legacies based on particular authors, it thus becomes imperative to investigate
the context(s) of an author’s reception, closely examining the shifting repre-
sentation(s) of that author over time and space. The attribution of ‘greatness’ to a
thinker, her enshrinement into a disciplinary canon, is an active, conscious process.
Forgotten thinkers are unearthed and branded as great by those who want to claim
them for their own camp, while the rightful legacy of an established ‘great thinker’
can be a source of extensive debate.109 Inventing a tradition linking one’s ideas to
those of a long-dead, respected, famous mind is one of the many ways in which one
can defend something by giving it ‘the sanction of perpetuity’.110 As a result, once
an author is placed in the category of ‘great thinkers’, her name comes to bear a
certain weight, to provide a certain degree of legitimacy to those who invoke her as
their forerunner. Since reception theory is explicitly geared towards understanding
the factors that ‘shape’ the reception of a text,111 it is thus particularly relevant for
shedding light on the dynamics behind the canonization of an author. It is notably
attuned to the role of political agendas in shaping reception,112 a factor that is likely
to be found at play in the construction of disciplinary canons.
generation at some time in the past’ (Ibid., 46.), which is a separate endeavor from the study of retro-
spectively established ‘traditions’ that often rest on imaginary links between otherwise separate individuals
and pursuits.
105Bell 2014.
106Lauterpacht 1946; Bull 1966; Kingsbury 1997; Jeffery 2006; Van Ittersum 2016. See also Nabulsi
1999b.
107Jahn 2006, 13.
108Bell 2002; Jahn 2006.
109For example, for the role of Hobbes as the presumed founder of liberal political theory, and the
emergence of this conception of his legacy in the twentieth century, see Farneti 2002. See also Vaughan
2000. For a critique of IR’s perilous caricature of Hobbes, see Malcolm 2002. On the divergent receptions of
Rousseau, see Lifschitz 2016.
110Hobsbawm and Ranger 1992, 2.
111Burke 2013, 32.
112Consider, for instance, the various receptions of Erasmus, notably in Spain and Italy. Silavana Seidel
Menchi emphasizes the fact that Erasmus’ Italian readers had their own agenda, which included disguising
their Protestant beliefs and legitimating a political attack on the papacy. Menchi 1987, cited in Burke 2013,
26–27. Another example is the case of Locke, whose diverse receptions come to light in Mark Goldie’s
fascinating anthology, see Goldie 1999. On the diverging receptions of Locke in the nineteenth and the
twentieth century and the ultimate establishment of his ‘liberal’ credentials, see Bell 2014. For a fascinating
case beyond the history of political thought, see notably Martial Poirson’s work on the reception of Molière
International Theory 125
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971918000192
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Walaeus Library LUMC, on 30 Apr 2019 at 11:24:50, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
As an illustration, it is worth briefly considering here the processes that led to
the canonization of two of IR’ main great thinkers, Thucydides and Kant (the
other ‘greats’ of the discipline being primarily Machiavelli, Hobbes, Grotius, and
Rousseau). As Keene has shown, the coronation of Thucydides as the father of
realism was by no means inevitable.113 It emerged out of a rather contingent
series of moves, and culminated ‘when a group of highly influential scholars in
US academia, such as Robert Keohane, Kenneth Waltz, and Robert Gilpin,
identified him as a paramount realist thinker in the late 1970s and 1980s’.114
These scholars did so because Thucydides served a crucial purpose for them: he
‘could be used to illustrate what they saw as a fundamental underlying continuity
in IR’ – a vital point for scholars seeking to develop a general, trans-epochal
theory of IR – and more specifically, a story could be weaved around his name to
support the claim that this continuity ‘was expressed through the persistence of
power politics and the logic of the balance of power’115 Ultimately, as Keene puts
it, ‘their reading of Thucydides’s History was, in a sense, an especially juicy cherry
to be picked’,116 and they did so with a lasting impact in the discipline. Indeed,
although a real cottage industry has developed since the 1990s around identifying
realist misreadings of Thucydides,117 these works seldom question the reliance on
Thucydides in the first place and as such have exacerbated rather than under-
mined his prevalence in the discipline.118 This is despite the fact that, as Keene
suggests, ‘Thucydides needs not be our only contemporary’,119 and perhaps even
more critically, it says absolutely nothing about the need to perhaps consider
whether Thucydides – or any other classical figure for that matter – should be
our ‘contemporary’ to begin with.
Kant, as the presumed father of liberalism, is a neat counterpart to Thucydides
in IR textbooks, and the story of his reception in the discipline shares much with
that of the Athenian. Kant is of course invoked in the discipline almost exclusively
for his essay on Perpetual Peace, which is seen as forming the historical founda-
tional stone for the sub-field of democratic peace theory. Yet, as Easley explains in
The War over Perpetual Peace120 – which surprisingly remains to this day the only
in-depth work on the reception of Kant in the discipline of IR121 – the inter-
pretation of Kant’s essay has been a profoundly divisive debate since its publication
in the late eighteenth century. Essentially, scholars have consistently disagreed as to
in France from the seventeenth century onward, the evolution of which was dictated by political events
from the necessity to reclaim Molière for the republican tradition in the late eighteenth century to the
desire to challenge the supremacy of an overbearing Britain and her equally imposing Shakespeare in the





117Ibid., 359. Citing Welch 2003, 307.
118Graham Allison’s wildly popular concept of “Thucydides’s trap” is an obvious example of this
continued prevalence, see supra note 55.
119Keene 2015, 367.
120Easley 2004.
121Though for a recent reassessment of Kant’s thinking on International Relations, see Molloy 2017.
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whether Kant endorses peace proposals at the state level or above the state level.122
More importantly still, Easley shows that the popularity of each line of inter-
pretation varied primarily with the rise and fall of hopes that international orga-
nizations could bring about a lasting peace, with the meaning of Kant’s essay
ultimately ending up a veritable hostage to the zeitgeist of different historical
periods. In the discipline of IR, the turning point was Doyle’s seminal article on
‘Kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs’,123 prior to which ‘there was no mention
of Perpetual Peace as intellectual forebear of the liberal peace phenomenon’.124
Hailing Kant’s contested essay as the ‘source of insights, policy, and hope’ for
‘appreciating the liberal legacy’,125 Doyle latched onto the interpretation of Per-
petual Peace that seemed most fitting for his time, namely the statist one over its
cosmopolitan counterpart, and brought it into the discipline with lasting con-
sequences. Today, evoking Kant in IR is often a shorthand for the theory that
democracies do not go to war with each other, and that as a result long-lasting
world peace will only be achievable once the vast majority of states have become
liberal democracies. The cracks in this eminently policy-relevant intellectual edifice
should perhaps encourage pause for thought.
Ultimately, and in light of these two examples, while the claim here is that we
must distinguish between a study of the reception of ideas based on concepts and
one based on authors, it may be said that in the case of the canonization of an
author, the author itself becomes, in some way, a form of concept. Invoking the
author in question becomes a means to refer to a set of ideas, to a particular
understanding of what abstract and contested terms such as ‘power politics’,
‘sovereignty’, or ‘liberalism’might mean. In the broadest sense, Bell reminds us that
‘[t]raditions are usually constructed around a canon of renowned thinkers, which
serves simultaneously as a reservoir of arguments, an index of historical continuity,
and a powerful source of intellectual authority’.126 But more specifically, an
author’s name can become associated with a precise position, providing a short-
hand for what may otherwise necessitate extensive – and possibly contestable –
elaboration. When one invokes, for instance, Thucydides, Hobbes, or Kant within a
tradition, the reference is often not so much to the individuals, with their idio-
syncratic lives and the specific aims they had in writing their canonized treatises,
but rather to the intellectual statement they provide within a debate, to the posi-
tions that are automatically associated with their person. Their name entails a set of
arguments (or many different sets, if one takes into account the different inter-
pretations of a single author), a collection of assumptions and their associated
ramifications, in a way that is not dissimilar to the role played by a concept such as
‘absolute sovereignty’ or ‘liberalism’. In using great thinkers as such, the receivers
of the text come to ‘decontextualize’ the author they are engaging with in order to
make her fit their own context and aspirations while nonetheless claiming her
historic heritage. In this sense, the emphasis in this article on the distinction
122For an earlier consideration of the diverging interpretations of Perpetual Peace amongst IR scholars
and an attempt to impose a more definite one, see Hurrell 1990. Easley in fact discusses Hurrell’s piece and
its place within the broader debate; Easley 2004, 88–90.
123Doyle 1983.
124Easley 2004, 74.
125Doyle 1983, 206, cited in Easley 2004, 74.
126Bell 2014, 686.
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between the study of authors and the study of concepts is made primarily to
highlight a shift in terms of the object of study and therefore of the chosen
methodology, keeping in mind that a more diligent study of authors and of their
reception may in fact underline the extent to which authors can become concepts,
fulfilling similar discursive functions and sharing the same purposes as heuristic
devices.
III. A combined approach
While it is frequent to read studies of authors in their original context, and possible
to find a number of works that examine the subsequent reception of their ideas,
contributions that combine the two have remained the exception. In this final
section, I wish to conclude by emphasizing the methodological potential of an
approach to the study of great thinkers that combines a synchronic analysis based
on the methodological insights of Skinnerian contextualism with a diachronic
analysis drawing on the tenets of reception theory.
An emphasis on the reception of a great thinker’s idea may seem at first as a
complementary – but separate – project from the examination of the author’s ideas
in their initial context, and particularly, from a close analysis of the author’s
original intentions. Indeed, reception theory long ignored the question of authorial
intention or ‘authorial intended meaning’ altogether, preferring to focus on the
issue of ‘received meaning’,127 and historians of political thought traditionally kept
reception theory at bay just as cultural and intellectual historians were engaging
with it at length. Yet, two main arguments can be made for a unified approach that
relies on these two avenues of inquiry at once in the study of great thinkers. First,
and in the most obvious sense, any project that seeks to understand both the
emergence and the impact of a particular author’s idea will find this methodolo-
gical approach greatly relevant. In IR, a discipline that has historically paid sig-
nificant attention to the thought of a few great authors, emphasizing the continued
importance of specific concepts within their thought (whether it be Hobbes on
sovereignty or Kant on perpetual peace, to name but the most famous ones),
developing an approach that encompasses both a rigorous understanding of the
author’s context and an analytical commitment to the longue durée would seem a
valuable endeavor.
The call for such an approach is reinforced by the fact that the discipline of IR
has sometimes erred in its appreciation of authors’ ideas specifically because it
remained abysmally unaware of the process of reception. This is particularly
obvious in the case of the English School, which built its ‘traditions’ based on ‘a
conflation of nineteenth-century appropriations of seventeenth-century thinkers,
such as Grotius and Hobbes, with the ideas of those thinkers themselves’.128
127For a detailed discussion, see Thompson 1993, 257–265.
128Hutchings et al. 2014, 389. A different, but similarly concerning claim, is the argument that because
Hedley Bull studied Grotius through the works of Cornelius van Vollenhoven, Lassa Oppenheim and
Hersch Lauterpacht, who were all ‘instrumental in the development of the “Grotian tradition” of inter-
national law in the twentieth century’ and whom ‘Bull considered members of a wider “Grotian tradition,”’
his understanding of ‘Grotius as an intellectual entity separable from the ‘Grotian tradition’… is in fact
situated wholly within what he constitutes as the tradition itself.’ As a result, Jeffery rightly notes, it is
therefore ‘not at all surprising that Bull is able to draw a set of “remarkable” resemblances between the two
sets of ideas,’ see Jeffery 2005, 79.
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Systematically untangling what these thinkers actually thought – to the extent that
it is possible – from what later generations of historians, lawyers, and other
practitioners claimed they did is an essential part of clarifying this muddled field
while shedding light on the actual provenance of our disciplinary narratives. If
greater efforts have been made to tease out the normative assumptions of each
theoretical approach,129 surely the fact that IR textbooks continue to propagate a
history of the modern states-system and of its presumed intellectual architects
constructed by nineteenth-century counter-revolutionary historians130 should be
an immediate source of concern. If the study of IR’s ‘great thinkers’ continues to be
an important part of the discipline, particularly in light of the turn to international
political thought,131 this untangling exercise can form the basis for a more rigorous
approach both to the nature of their thought and to the impact they had through
their actual reception over time.
Second, and more specifically, there is a rather straightforward case to be made
for the continued methodological relevance of a more traditional, synchronic
analysis of an author as a highly insightful component of the study of an author’s
reception. Naturally, reception studies encourage scholars ‘not to limit themselves
to the reconstructions of major thinkers, but to ask a much wider range of ques-
tions about recontextualizations, responses, uses, and so on’,132 pointing to ‘the
illusion of perfect communication’ and, in that process, ‘undermining the
importance of the intentions of writers’.133 However, the intention of the author
remains an important component of reception for a simple reason: it constitutes a
benchmark against which one can measure the extent to which the text has been
re-interpreted by the receivers. Burke emphasizes that in studying reception one
must ‘look for what is “lost in translation”, or what is distorted’, reminding us of
Cervantes’ famous observations that reading a text in translation is ‘like viewing
Flemish tapestries from the wrong side’.134 In other words, he explains, one has to
measure the ‘degrees of distance from the original’.135 It is not clear, however, how
one might be able to achieve this without some understanding of what the text was
originally intended to achieve.
In other words, and to push Cervantes’ metaphor a step further, is it only by
viewing both sides of the tapestry that one can appreciate the contrast between the
two images. If we only view the ‘wrong side’, we may well be aware that it is indeed
‘wrong’ to some extent and that the actual image is bound to differ in some way,
but we remain within the realm of speculative abstraction; the actual image may be
slightly different, or it could be entirely unrecognizable – we will never know. To
the extent that one is interested in analyzing the construction of traditions and
129Reus-Smit and Snidal 2008.
130Keene 2002b. For a more detailed analysis, see Devetak 2014b. Noting Armitage’s remark that ‘the
pivotal moments in the formation of modern international thought were often points of retrospective
reconstruction,’ Devetak shows the extent to which historians played a role in the depiction of the modern
world as a ‘world of states.’
131Though for a call to locate ‘international political thought’ beyond a canon of ‘great thinkers,’ see
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unveiling the scaffolding of intellectual canons, having a concrete understanding of
what the gap between the original and its derivatives entails becomes essential. In
fact, an awareness of the original is much more critical within this context than
suggested by Cervantes’ example. If in the example of the tapestry, the original and
its flip-side are literally co-constitutive of each other, this is clearly not the case
when we speak of the reception of texts. Indeed, the re-interpretations can depart
from the original to remarkable extents, as some receivers may use the text with
few concerns for the dead author’s original intentions.136 One particular instan-
tiation of this point is the fact that certain parts of an author’s text can be heavily
emphasized137 while others are entirely ignored or even concealed.138 As Bevir puts
it, speaking of traditions more broadly, ‘because people want to improve their
heritage by making it more coherent, more accurate, and more relevant to con-
temporary issues, they often do respond selectively to it; they accept some parts of
it, modify others, and reject others’.139 In this context, authorial intention truly has
an essential role to play in the study of an author’s reception, and a commitment to
the longue durée can thus be paired with a more traditional contextualist
investigation.
There are, of course, certain limitations to this approach, or at least certain
challenges that should be flagged. First of all, in studying the reception of an
author, one must address the various silences that can occur around the author’s
work. This can be the case when, as I have suggested, certain ideas or elements of
the text appear to be central to the original work but disappear during the
reception process. Under such circumstances, one is left to carefully speculate as to
what might explain the surprising omission. Even more strikingly, one must
consider the fact that over the course of an author’s afterlife, there will be periods
during which her work may recede into the background or be ignored entirely.
This can occur for various reasons, including mere neglect, a controversial repu-
tation, or a falling out of favor of certain types of argument. In light of this, a serial
contextualism based on an author rather than on a concept may well be episodic,
with important chronological gaps between the different receptions. There is thus
an important difference between the longue durée entailed by an author-based
serial contextualism and that entailed by a concept-based one, as concepts are more
likely to appear under different iterations in the work of various writers. When
136Though a notable point is that other receivers will read the text through their own understanding of
the author’s original intention. According to one approach (“reader-response criticism,” broadly speaking),
what the author actually intended is in this case ultimately a moot point; it does not matter, and it cannot
be recovered. Mark Bevir has put forward a compelling attempt to bring together the insights of inten-
tionalism with those of reader-response criticism, emphasizing that the meaning of a text stems from the
meaning it was given by individuals, whether these are the author herself or her later readers, see Bevir
1999.
137For instance, in the case of Locke, Bell explains that ‘[w]hereas parliamentary constitutionalism was
central to the British appropriation of Locke (via the retrojection of the Whigs), it was religious toleration
(via the retrojection of key elements of Puritanism) that did much of the ideological labour in the United
States.’ Bell 2014, 701.
138One notable example is the dismissal of Grotius’ arguments for the legitimate character of divisible
sovereignty, see Keene 2002a, 40–59. This particular move in the reception of Grotius’ writings in
International Relations arguably had a significant impact on the discipline, as it restricted the available set
of conceptual tools in a way that largely undermined the study of empires.
139Bevir 2000, 39. More broadly, see Bevir 1999.
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studying an author and her reception, a longue durée approach is just as much
about continuity as it is about discontinuity; the expansive chronological coverage
allows one to analyze the moments during which an author’s popularity surged and
to trace the construction of a seemingly continuous tradition of thought around
that author’s name, but also to shine a light on the various moments during which
the author was not in fact considered particularly remarkable. The latter, of course,
is a way to problematize the existing stories of continuity and to highlight the
contingency of the established canon.
Conclusion
Though some scholars have sought to account for the reception of certain authors
in IR, there has been a little explicit methodological reflection on what these types
of studies entail. The purpose of this article has been to dissect the different
elements involved, drawing on reception theory to highlight the most significant
methodological insights to keep in mind if one is to examine processes of reception
rigorously and systematically. Additionally, I have made a case for the importance
of first examining an author in her initial context in order to acquire a benchmark
against which the characteristics of the reception process can be measured. This is
in contrast to current approaches to intellectual history that focus either on ana-
lyzing an author’s thought within her original context, or on examining the
reception of the author at various points in time, without explicitly linking the two.
The dual contextualization I propose may be applied to a single work, by analyzing
it closely both in the author’s original context and in the various contexts of the
author reception. Alternatively, a study seeking to focus more heavily on the
reception process may establish this benchmark by drawing on the more classically
contextual (i.e. Cambridge School, broadly speaking) secondary literature to
acquire a sufficient sense of what the author’s original intentions were if these are
already relatively well established. It is worth noting that while processes of
reception have received quite a bit of attention in the case of the rediscovery of
classical authors between the Middle Ages and the early modern period, the same
cannot be said for the reception of early modern authors in the nineteenth and
twentieth century. The proposed methodological approach will be particularly
relevant for future studies that seek to account for these understudied, more recent
processes – which are of course particularly relevant to the discipline of IR – and its
precepts can be applied to authors beyond the specific field of international poli-
tical thought.140
The few aforementioned studies notwithstanding, the reception of great thinkers
in IR still remains a vastly under-researched area in the discipline, and this comes
with some significant costs. Systematically applying the present methodology in IR
will allow for a better understanding of what great thinkers actually intended to
express in their original context, and of what type of interests shaped their legacies
and gave us our contemporary interpretations of their works in the discipline. This
is important for three reasons. First, as I have sought to highlight through various
examples about the treatment of early modern authors in IR (Grotius, Hobbes, etc.)
as well as through my brief discussions of the receptions of Thucydides and Kant,
140One example is the recent work on the emergence of a field of scholarship around Adam Smith, see
Tribe 2015, 139–170.
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the histories of these authors’ receptions into the discipline underline the extent to
which our dominant understandings of their works were produced by later indi-
viduals with agendas of their own. As long as we simply accept these narratives, we
are bound to remain the slaves of these past agendas and to have little under-
standing of what insights these ‘great thinkers’ can presumably provide us with.
Second, and more importantly still, the approach I put forward provides the
tools for investigating the processes of instrumentalization – or even mere unin-
tentional misreading – of famous texts by both scholars and practitioners and to
assess the impact of this phenomenon on IR. As I have discussed, great thinkers are
often rediscovered or celebrated anew at opportune moments, when they can be
put to various broadly political uses. The glorification of their ideas and the novel
forms under which these authors are celebrated in their new contexts often result
from a conflation of contingent elements, be they for instance of a personal,
institutional, social, or more traditionally political kind. In providing an explicit
methodology for studying these processes, the proposed approach offers a way to
study how ideas actually come to have an impact in practice, when they are for
instance used as legitimating devices.
Third, and relatedly, this approach calls for those interested in ‘great thinkers’ in
IR to perhaps turn a more significant part of their attention to the makers of
greatness: the intermediaries who select various authors for canonization and seek
to use them in particular ways and for particular purposes. Whether as scholars or
as practitioners, they might not be particularly well known, but in their choices of
whom to glorify, they can indeed have a significant impact both on disciplinary
developments and – if they are lawyers or diplomats for instance – on the conduct
of IR. When great thinkers are used as weapons to defend particular projects or
ideologies over others, the agency lies with those who wield their name, and the
intellectual force of a Hobbes or a Grotius comes to be heavily mediated through
the minds of those who claim these authors’ legacy for themselves.
Ultimately, and as I noted at the very beginning of this article, great thinkers
have been and continue to be an important component of the discipline of IR. As
long as this remains the case, IR scholars must possess the tools to critically
evaluate the provenance of their presumed forebearers’ ideas. This article is an
attempt to begin filling what currently appears to be a significant lacuna on
this front.
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